Difference between revisions of "Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers"
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A government is designing a wage scheme to deter corruption in a two period game. The government can choose a period 1 and period 2 wage. The benefit of bribing is <math>b</math> and the probability of being caught is <math>p</math>. | A government is designing a wage scheme to deter corruption in a two period game. The government can choose a period 1 and period 2 wage. The benefit of bribing is <math>b</math> and the probability of being caught is <math>p</math>. | ||
| − | Authors solve for optimal wages to deter bribing. | + | Authors solve for optimal wages to deter bribing. Note that this can be costly, but recouped by using entrance fees. |
Revision as of 16:37, 12 June 2011
Reference(s)
Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
Abstract
No abstract available at this time
Topic and Basic ideas
A government is designing a wage scheme to deter corruption in a two period game. The government can choose a period 1 and period 2 wage. The benefit of bribing is [math]b[/math] and the probability of being caught is [math]p[/math].
Authors solve for optimal wages to deter bribing. Note that this can be costly, but recouped by using entrance fees.
