Difference between revisions of "Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control"
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imported>Bo (New page: Note similarity to Baron and Ferejohn (1989): * Multi-lateral, * Bargaining * Divide the "pie" (not the dollar) * Non-cooperative * Use of stationary equilibrium * Divisibility and trans...) |
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* T is always distributed equally among n districts so <math>t_{i}=T/n</math>. | * T is always distributed equally among n districts so <math>t_{i}=T/n</math>. | ||
* Proposals are fully characterized by <math>b\in B</math> and net benefits are <math>z_{i}=b_{i}-T/n</math>. | * Proposals are fully characterized by <math>b\in B</math> and net benefits are <math>z_{i}=b_{i}-T/n</math>. | ||
| − | * Payoffs are discounted: <math>\delta^{\tau}z_{i}=U_{i}(z,\tau)< | + | * Payoffs are discounted: <math>\delta^{\tau}z_{i}=U_{i}(z,\tau)</math>. Extensive form is the same as before for closed rule. |
Revision as of 18:16, 16 September 2011
Note similarity to Baron and Ferejohn (1989):
- Multi-lateral,
- Bargaining
- Divide the "pie" (not the dollar)
- Non-cooperative
- Use of stationary equilibrium
- Divisibility and transferability of benefits.
Looks at cases where B<T (benefits less than costs).
Programs are characterized by B, T (total benefits and total taxes). P (programs) are characterized by [math]B/T, P\in[0,\inf][/math].
- [math]B: \{b|b_{i}\gt 0, i=1,2,3,...,n, \sum b_{i}\leq B} * T is always distributed equally among n districts so \lt math\gt t_{i}=T/n[/math].
- Proposals are fully characterized by [math]b\in B[/math] and net benefits are [math]z_{i}=b_{i}-T/n[/math].
- Payoffs are discounted: [math]\delta^{\tau}z_{i}=U_{i}(z,\tau)[/math]. Extensive form is the same as before for closed rule.
