Difference between revisions of "BPP Field Exam Papers"

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  '''Total (no dups):'''            '''85+6'''    ('''41+'''''5''''')+3'''
 
  '''Total (no dups):'''            '''85+6'''    ('''41+'''''5''''')+3'''
  
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Column 1 lists the course or topic, column 2 indicates the number of paper agreed + the number of unapproved additions, Column 2 indicates the (number of full write-ups + ''number of reviewed papers without full write-ups'') + the number of full write ups of unapproved additions.  
+
Column 1 lists the course or topic, column 2 indicates the number of paper agreed + the number of unapproved additions, column 3 indicates the (number of full write-ups + ''number of reviewed papers without full write-ups'') + the number of full write ups of unapproved additions.  
  
 
In the sections below: '''Bold face''' indicates a complete write-up. '''''Italic-bold face''''' indicates a reviewed paper with a stub or other incomplete write-up.
 
In the sections below: '''Bold face''' indicates a complete write-up. '''''Italic-bold face''''' indicates a reviewed paper with a stub or other incomplete write-up.

Revision as of 14:13, 20 June 2010

Insert the following code at the head of each page in this section:
*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]

Summary

The following is the count of papers by topic: 

Innovation:                  12+2     12+2
   Mowery:                   12+2     12+2
Strategy:                    12+1     4
   Dal Bo:                    4       4
   Tadelis:                   4       0
   de Figueiredo:             4+1     0
Institutions:                23+4    (4+5)+2
   Spiller:                  23+4    (4+5)+2
Polictical Science:          21       11
   Dal Bo:                   10       0
   de Figueiredo:            11       11
Auctions and Contracts:      19       10
   Morgan:                    9       3
   Tadelis:                  10       7

Total:                       87+7    (42+5)+4
Total (no dups):             85+6    (41+5)+3

Column 1 lists the course or topic, column 2 indicates the number of paper agreed + the number of unapproved additions, column 3 indicates the (number of full write-ups + number of reviewed papers without full write-ups) + the number of full write ups of unapproved additions.

In the sections below: Bold face indicates a complete write-up. Italic-bold face indicates a reviewed paper with a stub or other incomplete write-up.

BPP Field Exam Paper Short List

Innovation (Mowery)

See also: BPP Innovation

  1. Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002), "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. pdf
  2. Arrow, K.J. (1958), "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. pdf
  3. Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 35, 569-596. pdf
  4. Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003), "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. pdf
  5. Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990), "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. pdf
  6. Lamoreaux, N. and K. Sokoloff (2005), "Decline of the Independent Inventor: A Schumpeterian Story", NBER working paper #11654. pdf
  7. Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001), "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. pdf
  8. Murray F., and S. Stern (2005), "Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge? An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis", NBER working paper #11465. pdf
  9. Nelson, R.R. (1959), "The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research", Journal of Political Economy 67, 297-306. pdf
  10. Teece, D.J. (1986), "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. pdf
  11. Thursby J., A. Fuller, & M. Thursby (2007), "US Faculty Patenting Inside and Outside the University", NBER working paper #13256. pdf
  12. Ziedonis, R.H. (2004), "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. pdf

Unapproved additions:

  1. Merges, R. P. (1999), "As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform", Berkeley Technology Law Journal. pdf
  2. Mowery, D.C. (2009), "Plus ca change: Industrial R&D in the Third Industrial Revolution", forthcoming, Industrial and Corporate Change. pdf

Strategy (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de Figueiredo)

Dal Bo

  1. Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977), "Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity", American Economic Review 67, 297-308. pdf (Class Slides)
  2. Hotelling, H. (1929), "Stability in competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57. pdf
  3. Salop (1979), "Monopolistic competition with outside goods", Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156. pdf
  4. Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982), "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. pdf

Tadelis

  1. Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004), "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. pdf
  2. Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. pdf
  3. Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. pdf
  4. Gibbons, Robert (2005), "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. pdf

de Figueiredo

  1. Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000), "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. pdf
  2. Montgomery, C. (1994), "Corporate diversification", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, pp.163-178. pdf
  3. Teece, D. (1982), "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. pdf
  4. Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997), "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. pdf

Unapproved Additions:

  1. Winter, S. (2003), "Understanding dynamic capabilities", Strategic Management Journal, 24, pp.991-995. pdf

Institutions (Spiller)

  1. Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 pdf
  2. Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999), "Informal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. pdf
  3. Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003), "Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information", American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. pdf
  4. Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. pdf
  5. Demsetz, Harold (1968), "Why Regulate Utilities", Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. pdf
  6. Garicano, Luis (2000), "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. pdf
  7. Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. pdf
  8. Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. pdf
  9. Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 pdf
  10. Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. pdf
  11. McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984), "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179. pdf
  12. McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control", JLEO, pp. 243-277. pdf
  13. Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982), "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 pdf
  14. North, Douglass (1991). "Institutions", Journal of Economic Perspectives pdf
  15. Prendergast, Canice (2003), "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency", Journal of Political Economy. pdf
  16. Spiller, Pablo (2008), "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications", NBER Working Paper 14152, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152 pdf
  17. Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992), "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. pdf
  18. Weingast and Marshall (1988), "The Industrial Organization of Congress",Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. pdf
  19. Whinston (2003), "On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 pdf
  20. Williamson, Oliver (1979), "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. pdf
  21. Williamson, Oliver (1991), "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 pdf
  22. Williamson, Oliver E. (1999), "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. pdf
  23. Williamson, Oliver, (1983), "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange", The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 pdf

Additional Readings:

  1. Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. pdf
  2. Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104. pdf

Other Spiller Readings (from the course):

  1. De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), "An informational perspective on administrative procedures", Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. pdf
  2. Spiller, Pablo (1990), "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101. pdf

Polictical Science

Dal Bo

  1. Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf
  2. Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf
  3. Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
  4. Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf
  5. Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf
  6. Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf
  7. Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf
  8. Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
  9. Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
  10. Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf

de Figueiredo

  1. Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. pdf
  2. Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. pdf (Class Handout and Class Slides, © Bo Cowgill and Tarek Ghani)
  3. Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. pdf (1999 Working Paper pdf)
  4. Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. pdf (2006 Draft Paper pdf)
  5. Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
  6. de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 pdf
  7. de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. pdf
  8. Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. pdf
  9. Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. pdf
  10. Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
  11. Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, available on his website pdf (Class Slides: Set1 Set2, © Adrienne Hosek)

Auctions and Contracts

Morgan

  1. Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994), "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. link pdf
  2. Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006), "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. link pdf
  3. Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003), "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. link pdf
  4. Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. link pdf
  5. Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 link pdf
  6. Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001), "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press pdf
  7. Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988), "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. link pdf
  8. Konrad, Kai A. (2007), "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01, link pdf
  9. Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008), "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. link pdf

Tadelis

  1. Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000), "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. pdf
  2. Diamond, D. (1989), "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 pdf
  3. Forbes, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009), "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. pdf
  4. Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. pdf
  5. Goldberg, Victor P. (1977), "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:250-261 pdf
  6. Holmstrom B., (1999), "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 pdf
  7. Kreps, D. (1990), "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through Google Books)
  8. Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008), "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics. pdf
  9. Tadelis, S. (2001), "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 pdf
  10. Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. pdf
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