Difference between revisions of "Sequential Matching of Entrepreneurs to Accelerators and Venture Capitalists"

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*Compare with R code from NYU (using current solvers/optimizers, and with Gurobi)
 
*Compare with R code from NYU (using current solvers/optimizers, and with Gurobi)
 
==Work Done in Late November by Dylan & Ed==
 
SBIR Data taken from McNair\Projects\SBIR\Data\Aggregate SBIR\SBIR.txt. -Note! This file needed to be opened in excel to be readable, and took a very long time to open due to its large size. SBIR firm names converted to a pivot table to eliminate exact repeat entries, and then exported to a txt file, NSBIR. NSBIR then matched using The Matcher in mode 2 with the following code "-file1="NSBIR.txt" -file2="NSBIR.txt" -mode=2" Output then placed in McNair\Projects\MatchingEntrepsToVC\Matching\Output. The original pre-matched, cleaned NSBIR.txt file is moved to McNair\Projects\MatchingEntrepsToVC\Matching\Intput.
 

Revision as of 12:57, 30 November 2017

Academic Paper
Title Sequential Matching of Entrepreneurs to Accelerators and Venture Capitalists
Author Ed Egan, Jeremy Fox
RAs Amir Kazempour
Status In development
© edegan.com, 2016


Summary

This paper describes a multi-stage matching model and estimates this model using data on entrepreneurs that match to accelerators and (lead) venture capitalists.

See Fox (2008) - An Empirical Repeated Matching Game Applied to Market for a brief write up on Jeremy's theory paper

Simple Outline of Model

As of now, the goal is to simulate a repeated matching model with dynamically optimizing agents. More specifically, there are two sides for a matching market with transferable utility (generically, call these men and women for now) with a continuum of agents, but a finite number of types. They participate in matches for T periods and receive utility that is a sum of a structural component (determined solely by their type and the type they are matched with) and a individual taste component (with some known distribution).


What distinguishes this model from a static matching model is that the agents have some probability of transitioning between types that is conditional on the match they make in the previous period (e.g., a man of low type might be more likely to change into a man of high type after being matched to a woman of high type). When making these matches, the agents take these transition probabilities into account when evaluating expected future utility. This adds a dynamic element to the model.

Work to do

  • Code up three algorithms to simulate match(primal,IPFP,dual)
  • Compare with R code from NYU

Work done so far

  • Coded up primal and IPFP (may have errors)

Work to do in near term

  • Compare with R code from NYU (using current solvers/optimizers, and with Gurobi)