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Fox Hsu Yang (2015) - Unobserverd Heterogeneity in Matching Games with an Application to Venture Capital (view source)
Revision as of 00:00, 18 October 2016
, 00:00, 18 October 2016→Random notes
* This paper investigates what data on the sorting patterns between agents can tell us about the distributions of unobserved agent characteristics relevant for sorting.
* We use data on many markets with finite numbers of players and different realizations of observables and unobservables in each market.
* We require at least one continuous, observable per match or per agent.
* In the baseline transferable utility matching game, the primitive that governs sorting is the matrix that collects the production values for each potential match in a matching market. The production level of each match is additively separable in observable and unobservable terms.
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