View source for Harhoff (2007) - The Strategic Use Of Patents And Its Implications For Enterprise And Competition Policies

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|Has title=The Strategic Use Of Patents And Its Implications For Enterprise And Competition Policies
|Has author=Harhoff
|Has year=2007
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*This page is referenced in the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]
*This page is listed on the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page

==Reference==

*Harhoff, Dietmar, Hall, Bronwyn H, von Graevenitz, Georg, Hoisl, Karin, Wagner, Stefan, Gambardella, Alfonso and Giuri, Paola (2007), "The strategic use of patents and its implications for enterprise and competition policies", Report commissioned by European Commission

 @article{harhoff2007strategic,
   title={The strategic use of patents and its implications for enterprise and competition policies},
   author={Harhoff, Dietmar and Hall, Bronwyn H and von Graevenitz, Georg and Hoisl, Karin and Wagner, Stefan and Gambardella, Alfonso and Giuri, Paola},
   journal={Report commissioned by European Commission},
   year={2007},
   abstract={This report was commissioned as a study into the strategic use of patents. In the course of its case investigations and legislative reviews the European Commission became aware of changes in the use of intellectual property, in particular the use of patents. It was noted that firms uses of intellectual property are becoming increasingly strategic. This raised concerns about the implications of firms patenting behaviour for enterprise and competition policy. The following report contains a comprehensive review of patenting behaviour, the extent to which patenting i s becoming more strategic and the implications this has for c ompetition and enterprise policies.},
   discipline={Policy Report},
   research_type={Theory, Discussion},
   industry={All},
   thicket_stance={Pro},
   thicket_stance_extract={In general the complementarity of patents i n complex technologies gives rise to greater frequency of interaction between firms. This happens when firms disentangle the patent thicket and insure themselves against hold-up through licensing or similar forms of cooperation and coordination.},
   thicket_def={#A-T, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},
   thicket_def_extract={In the field of biomedical research an early paper by Heller and Eisenberg (1998) raised serious questions regarding the effects of patenting on research productivity in this field, especially at the level of basic scientific research. they argue that patent thickets in biomedical research would make it difficult or impossible for researchers to access basic research tools. By implication research progress in these industries would be stifled. More recent work by Walsh, Arora and Cohen (2002) and Walsh, Cho and Cohen (2005) does not show that these concerns are generally valid. In the field of nanotechnology Lemley (2005) has documented that firms and universi ties are patenting at an unprecedented pace for such a new technology. He points out that this is the first new technology to emerge in which basic scientific building blocks are being patented... What unifies all of this work is its focus on patenting in technologies in which a product is based on a large number of patents, i.e., industries in which products are complex. These patents are valuable only as a set of complementary patent rights. Thus, assumption (iv) 37 of the traditional view of patents is violated. Shapiro (2001) argues that firms in industries based on such complex technologies face a growing patent thicket: a dense web of overlapping patents in which a firm is often faced by rivals that hold patents which may block the use of its own patents... In such cases the various patents embodied in the product become technological complements. Technological complementarity is one cause for overlapping patents and for the existence of blocking patents. Thus it is one precondition for the emergence of patent thickets and for the amassing of patent portfolios... It may be that the firms involved are attempting to reduce transactions costs that arise within a patent thicket.},  
   tags={Complements, Substitutes, Fences, Strategic Patenting},
   filename={Harhoff (2007) - The Strategic Use Of Patents And Its Implications For Enterprise And Competition Policies.pdf}
 }

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==Abstract==

This report was commissioned as a study into the strategic use of patents. In the course of its case investigations and legislative reviews the European Commission became aware of changes in the use of intellectual property, in particular the use of patents. It was noted that firms uses of intellectual property are becoming increasingly strategic. This raised concerns about the implications of firms patenting behaviour for enterprise and competition policy. The following report contains a comprehensive review of patenting behaviour, the extent to which patenting i s becoming more strategic and the implications this has for c ompetition and enterprise policies.