View source for Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo

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Back to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]]

==Background==
Committees allow for division of labor and gains from specialization.  However, a committee also has gate keeping power.  If gates kept closed, the status quo prevails.  If gates opened, the policy outcome depends on if open or closed rule is use.

===Open Rule===
If committee opens gates, legislators propose policies to challenge status quo.  Simply majority voting selects Condorcet winner <math>x_{m}</math>.  Committee only opens gate if he prefers <math>x_{m}</math> to <math>x_{0}</math> the status quo.

Suppose <math>x_{0} < x_{c} < x_{m}</math>.  We can see that the median of the committee prefers <math>x_{0}</math> to <math>x_{m}</math>, so he will keep the gates closed and not allow a vote, as voting will result in  <math>x_{m}</math>.  Thus, we get a status quo bias under open rule.

===Closed Rule===
The closed rule solves these types of commitment problems.